Abstract. Though there are intensive researches on off-line electronic cash (e-cash), the current computer network infrastructure sufficiently accepts on-line e-cash. The on-line means that the payment protocol involves with the bank, and the off-line means no involvement. For customers' privacy, the e-cash system should satisfy unlinkability, i.e., any pair of payments is unlinkable w.r.t. the sameness of the payer. In addition, for the convenience, exact payments, i.e., the payments with arbitrary amounts, should be also able to performed. In an existing offline system with unlinkable exact payments, the customers need massive computations. On the other hand, an existing on-line system does not satisfy the efficiency and the perfect unlinkability simultaneously. This paper proposes an on-line system, where the efficiency and the perfect unlinkability are achieved simultaneously.
Introduction
To solve privacy problem in electronic payments, many electronic cash (e-cash) systems have been proposed. In e-cash systems, a customer withdraws electronic coins from a bank, and the customer anonymously pays the coins to a vendor. The vendor deposits the paid coins in the bank. The important properties are the unlinkability and exact payments. The unlinkability is the strong anonymity, and it means that any other one except the trusted third party cannot determine whether two payments are made by the same customer. In linkable anonymous e-cash systems, the linked payments enable the other one to trace the payer by other means (i.e., correlating the payments' locality, date, frequency, etc.). In practice, exact payments, i.e., payments of arbitrary amounts, are desirable.
E-cash systems are classified into two types: on-line and off-line. In the online type, the payment protocol, where a customer pays a coin to a vendor, involves with the bank. Thus, note that the deposit protocol is unnecessary. On the other hand, in the off-line one, the customer communicates with only the vendor during the payment protocol. A lot of off-line systems have been proposed so far (e.g., [3, 13, 8, 14] ). The merits of the off-line type are that the payment communications are distributed, and that the payments are performed without a global communication channel. However, under the current state, a lot of powerful servers can deal with the burst communications, and the wireless network enables us to utilize Internet anywhere. Furthermore, the on-line e-cash system has the big advantage that over-spending is completely prevented: The bank can detect and stop over-spending during the payment protocol. On the other hand, in the off-line system, after over-spending was caused, it can be just detected. Therefore, on-line systems are sufficiently attractive.
For off-line exact payments, divisible e-cash systems have been proposed (e.g, [8] ), where a customer divides a withdrawn coin into sub-coins and pays part of them. The recent system proposed in [14] satisfies the unlinkability of all the payments. However, the payment protocol needs inefficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge with the binary challenge. Let N be (the total coin amount)/ (minimum divisible unit amount), i.e., the divisibility precision. Then, for example, in the usual case of N = 100, 000 (i.e., the total coin amount is $1000 and the minimum divisible unit amount is 1 cent), the payment protocol needs about 600 exponentiations. Additionally, the deposit protocol also needs massive computations including O(N ) exponentiations.
On the other hand, an on-line e-cash system with unlinkable exact payments using anonymous change is proposed [4] . In the system, before a payment, a customer anonymously pays coins with more than paid amount to the bank, and is returned changes, i.e., new coins with the exact paid amount in different denominations. However, this approach requires the complexity that is linear in the number of the coins. A simple way to reduce coins is to introduce many denominations. Consider that denominations for all possibly amounts are set up. Then, it weakens the unlinkability: In payment transaction T 1 , a customer obtains a coin with the paid amount a and another coin with the remainder b. In the next T 2 , he offers the coin with b. Though a blinding can make the latter coin and T 1 unlinkable, the amount b itself links T 1 and T 2 . Thus, if transactions with b rarely occur, T 1 and T 2 are linked. Since there are a lot of denominations, such a rare amount may occur. Next, consider another case, where denominations for the amount 2 i (0 ≤ i ≤ log N ) are set up. Then, a payment needs O(log N ) coins, which is about 17 in the example of N = 100, 000. Since the payment in [4] requires about 10 multi-exponentiations per a coin, the total cost is massive. Moreover, for less denominations set up, more coins are needed. Thus, this does not achieve the efficiency and unlinkability simultaneously. This paper proposes an on-line e-cash system with unlinkable exact payments, where both the efficiency and unlinkability are achieved. Our scheme adopts an approach similar to the previous on-line system [4] using anonymous change. A coin is a digital signature w.r.t. the bank's key. In the previous system, the public key of the signature indicates the denomination, namely the amount of the coin. This causes the link of transactions via the paid amount. In our scheme, the amount information is signed as a message. Furthermore, during the payment, the signed message is concealed by an encryption and an efficient zero-knowledge technique. Thus, linking transactions via the amount is infeasible. On the other hand, since a single coin indicates arbitrary amount, the number of the paid coin is always 1 and the complexity of a payment transaction is also O(1) w.r.t. N .
Model and Requirements
We adopt the model of e-cash system with trustees-based revocable anonymity [4, 13, 8, 14] to protect illegal acts of anonymous customers. In this model, trusted third parties, called trustees, participate in the system. The trustees cooperatively can revoke the anonymity of payments to protect the illegal acts as money laundering and so on. Though, in this paper, one trustee has the authority of the revocation for simplicity, it is easily extended into the the model of multiple trustees by using the threshold cryptosystems.
Our model consists of 6 protocols: In advance, setup protocol sets up the keys of the bank and trustee. By establishment protocol, a customer opens his account in the bank, and withdraws an initial coin. Using withdrawal protocol, the customer obtains a coin with the amount a + b, where a is the amount that he owns before this protocol and b is the amount withdrawn from his account. The requirements for on-line e-cash systems with unlinkable exact payments are as follows:
Unforgeability: Coins cannot be forged. Furthermore, anyone without a coin cannot perform withdrawals and payments. Consistency: From the bank, a customer can obtain only consistent coins, i.e., the coins with the amount a + b in the withdrawal, and with the amount c − d in the payment, where a, b, c, d are the amounts introduced above. No over-spending: An over-spender can be prevented and identified. Overspending means that a coin is spent twice or more, and additionally that a coin is spent for the payment whose amount is more than the coin's amount. No swindling: No one except the owner of a coin can spend the coin. Anonymity: No one except the payer and the trustee can trace the payer from the payment. Unlinkability: No one except the payer and the trustee can determine whether any pair of payments is executed by the same customer, unless the payments cause over-spending. Amounts secrecy: Both the amounts of the currently spent coin and the consequently obtained coin in every withdrawal and payment are kept secret. Anonymity revocation: Anonymity of a transcript of a payment can be revoked only by the trustee and when necessary, where the following revocation procedures should be accomplished: Owner tracing: To identify the payer of a targeted payment. Coin tracing: To link a customer's identity to the payments made by the customer. Only the transcript for which a judge's order is given must be de-anonymized. Exact payments: A customer can pay arbitrary amount up to the monetary amount of an unspent coin.
Preliminaries

Assumptions and Cryptographic Tools
Our system utilizes Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's signature scheme whose security is based on the strong RSA assumption. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus for safe primes p, q (i.e., p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, and p, q, p , q are prime), and let QR(n) be the set of quadratic residues modulo n, that is, the cyclic subgroup of Z * n generated by an element of order p q . The strong RSA assumption on QR(n) means that finding (u ∈ QR(n), e ∈ Z >1 ) s.t. u e = z (mod n) on inputs (n, z ∈ QR(n)) is infeasible. Furthermore, note that QR(n) also satisfies the DDH assumption. Including the signature scheme, we use cryptographic tools on QR(n) as follows. Hereafter, we use notations: Let [a, a + d] be the integer interval of all integers int such that a ≤ int ≤ a + d, for an integer a and a positive integer d. Let [a, a+d) be the integer interval of all int such that a ≤ int < a+d, and let (a, a + d) be the interval for all int such that a < int < a + d.
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme for blocks of messages.
Key generation: Let n , m , s , e , be security parameters s.t. s ≥ n + m + and e ≥ m + 2, where controls the statistical closeness of the distribution simulated in the security proof of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme to the actual distribution (in practice, ≈ 160) [6] . The secret key consists of safe primes p, q, and the public key consists of n = pq of length
where L is the number of blocks.
As proved in [6] , this scheme is existentially unforgeable against the adaptive chosen messege attack.
Commitment scheme. A commitment scheme on QR(n) is proposed by Damgård and Fujisaki [10] , whose security is based on the strong RSA assumption. The following is a slightly modified version due to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [6] .
Key generation: The public key consists of a secure RSA modulus n of length n , h from QR(n), and g from the group generated by h. Commitment: For the public key, input m of length m , and randomness r ∈ R Z n , the commitment C is computed as C = g m h r .
ElGamal cryptosystem. As well as [1], we adopt the ElGamal cryptosystem on QR(n).
Key generation: Let n , n, g be common to the above schemes. The secret key is x ∈ Z n and the public key consists of n, g and y = g x .
Encryption: For the public key, input m ∈ QR(n) and randomness r ∈ R Z n ,
Paillier cryptosystem. We furthermore adopt Paillier cryptosystem [15] using the modulus of a composite number, but its security is based on another assumption, called the decisional composite residuosity assumption [15, 11] .
Key generation: Let n be a security parameter. The secret key consists of safe primes p, q, and the public key consists of n = pq of length n , and g, where g is a random element of Z * n 2 with the order devided by n. Encryption: For the public key, input m ∈ Z n and randomness r ∈ R Z n , the ciphertext P is computed as
Zero-knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
As main building blocks, we use honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, abbreviated as P Ks. The proofs used in our scheme show the relations among secret representations of elements in the group QR(n), as follows:
This protocol is due to [10] . The computation cost is one multi-exponentiation for the prover and the verifier, respectively. Furthermore, P Ks of two representations, where a part in one representation is equal to another part in the other representation, can be easily constructed.
P K of representation with parts in intervals.
for some i. For this P K, two types are known. One is due to Boudot [2] , where it is assured that the knowledge exactly lies in the interval. However, this P K needs the computations of about 10 normal P Ks of a representation. Another type appears in [7] for example, where the integer the prover knows in fact lies in the narrower interval than the interval the proved knowledge lies in. However, its efficiency is comparable to that of the normal P K, and this is why we use the later type.
, where˜ is a security parameter derived from the challenge size and from the security parameter controlling the statistical zero-knowledge-ness (in practice,˜ ≈ 160).
P K of representation with non-negative part. This P K proves the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n), where the i-th part is a non-negative integer. Since we need to prove that the knowledge is exactly 0 and over, we adopt the P K due to Boudot [2] . The computation cost is 7 and 4 multi-exponentiations for the prover and the verifier, respectively.
Furthermore, we need a P K proving that the message in a Paillier ciphertext is equal to a message in a commitment on QR(n). P K for connection between commitment and Paillier ciphertext. Let (n, g, h) be the public key of the above commitment on QR(n), and let (n , g ) be that of Paillier cryptosystem. This P K proves the knowledge of m, r, r s.
) and r ∈ Z n , and P = g m r n (mod n 2 ) for r ∈ Z n . This P K is described in [12] , and is the combination of a P K of a representation on QR(n) and a P K for Paillier encryption [9, 11] .
We often use notations for P Ks, as P K{(α, β, . . .) : R(α, β, . . .)}, which means the P K to prove the secret knowledge α, β, . . . satisfying the relation R(α, β, . . .).
Proposed System
Idea
The base of our system is the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme. Let Sign(m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) be the signature on three messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 . Furthermore, this scheme equips two types of protocols. By using one type, a receiver sends commitments of m 1 , m 2 , m 3 to a signer and obtains Sign(m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) without revealing the messages to the signer. The other protocol allows the owner of the signature to prove the knowledge of the messages and the signature in the zero-knowledge fashion. We remark that this signature scheme is generalization of certificates in [1, 5] , which correspond to the version of Sign(m 1 ).
Our system regards bank On the other hand, both withdrawal and payment protocols force the customer to send f (y) with the verifiability, where f is a DL (discrete log) type of one-way function. This allows the bank to detect whether the same coin is spent twice or more. Moreover, the secret x is common to all coins, and is linked to identity of the payer. This information is used for anonymity revocation.
Proposed Protocols
We describe the details of proposed protocols. Let B, T , C, V denote a bank, a trustee, a customer, and a vendor, respectively.
Setup: In advance, B sets up the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme and the commitment scheme, and T sets up the ElGamal cryptosystem and Paillier cryptosystem, as follows: Let n be a security parameter. Then, B computes two ( n /2)-bit primes p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1, where p and q are primes, and then sets n = pq. B also chooses a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , b, c ∈ R QR(n) . Furthermore, he sets up the commitment scheme on QR(n) by generating g and h. He publishes (n, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , b, c, g, h) as the public key, and keeps the factorization of n as the secret key. On the other hand, T chooses a secret key x T ∈ R Z n and computes the public key y T = g x T on the ElGamal cryptosystem. Additionally, for the Paillier cryptosystem, T computes another RSA modulus n of length n , and chooses g ∈ R Z * n 2 with the order devided by n . T 's public key is (y T , n , g ) and the secret key consists of x T and the factorization of n .
Let x , y , m be the lengths of customers' secrets x, y and coin amount m, respectively, where values x, y, m are messages signed in the CamenischLysyanskaya scheme. Then, for security parameters s , e in the scheme, we need the relationship e ≥ max( x , y , m ) + 2 and s ≥ n + max( x , y , m ) + , where is also a security parameter for the security of the scheme, as mentioned in Section 3.1.
We need another security parameter˜ that is for P K of intervals as shown in Section 3.2. To simplify the description, we introduce interval notations as follows: Define X = [0, 2
). Since the proposed protocols adopt the efficient P K of the intervals, we need to prepare the narrower intervalsX = [2 
Note that s i / ∈ S is also permitted, since |s i | has only to be larger than n + max( x , y , m ) + . Thus, in the verification of the signature, check of s i ∈ S is omitted.
Establishment: When a customer C opens his account in B, C obtains an initial coin (s 0 , e 0 , v 0 ) from B. For this, C performs the following protocol with B via an authenticated channel:
r0 , where x ∈ RX , y 0 ∈ RỸ , and r 0 ∈ RÑ , and computes a Paillier ciphertext P = g x r mod n 2 , where r ∈ R Z n . C sends C 1 , C 2 , P to B, and proves the knowledge of the secrets by 
, where y i ∈ RỸ and r i ∈ RÑ . Additionally, C computes α, β, γ, δ, , ζ, η, θ, ι, κ, λ, µ) :
M and e i−1 ∈ E (i.e., the correctness of the own coin), in addition to Lemma 1 and 2) . As shown in Theorem 1 (Consistency), and 
In addition to the statements proved by the P K of the withdrawal protocol, Owner tracing:
to return C 1 to B, and prove the correctness by P K{α : Coin tracing:
1. From the establishment transcript of the targeted customer, B sends P to T . 
Discussion
Security
To show the security, we prepare the following lemmas. 
On the other hand, the P K in the payment proves the knowledge
In addition, note that the P Ks in the establishment, withdrawal and payment prove the correctness of These lemmas can be proved as [6] . Now, we discuss the properties of the proposed system. Theorem 1. The proposed system satisfies the requrements in Section 2.
Proof sketch.
Unforgeability: From Lemma 3, a coin is existentially unforgeable, even if valid coins are adaptively obtained from the bank. From Lemma 1, the P Ks in the withdrawal and the payment protocol prove the knowledge of the coin and the corresponding secrets and amount. Thus, withdrawals and payments cannot be performed without a coin.
Consistency: In the withdrawal, forṁ i−1 (resp.,ṁ i ) of an old coin (resp., the new coin) and withdrawn amountm i , the P K ensuresṁ i =ṁ i−1 +m i , from Lemma 2. Similarly, in the payment, the P K ensuresṁ i =ṁ The other properties hold clearly.
Efficiency
We concentrate in the withdrawal and payment that are frequently executed by customers. Note that both protocols have the complexity that is independent from the divisibility density N , since the customer spend a single coin in a transaction. Closely, the withdrawal needs 10 multi-exponentiations for the customer, and the payment needs about 20 multi-exponentiations. This is sufficiently efficient, compared with the previous payment protocol [4] , which requires more than 100 multi-exponentiations in the case of the binary denominations and N = 100, 000.
Finally, we discuss a bottleneck on the scalability. In the proposed system, B must manage a database of D i−1 , whose size is in proportion to the number of all coins of all customers. That is the number of withdrawal and payment transactions of all customers, since each transaction uses only one coin. On the other hand, the previous systems [4, 8, 14] also require this type of database, whose size is in proportion to the number of all coins of all customers. However, there is a difference that the previous systems need multiple coins (or devided sub-coins) in a payment. Therefore, the database in our system is less than that in the previous systems, which is another advantage of our system.
